On June 17, 2015, Dylan Roof, a white supremacist, carried out one of the deadliest racially motivated mass shootings in recent U.S. history at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Roof killed nine African American churchgoers, including the church’s pastor, Clementa C. Pinckney, while they were gathered for Bible study. Roof’s actions were not only deeply traumatic for the victims and their families but also for the broader African American community and the nation as a whole. Despite the clear evidence that the shooting was racially motivated, Roof did not face charges under the Domestic Terrorism statute. This raises several important questions: Why was Roof not charged with domestic terrorism, and could a future president, such as Donald Trump, potentially pardon him?
The Charleston Shooting as a Case of Domestic Terrorism
Domestic terrorism is defined in U.S. federal law under the Patriot Act (2001), which characterizes domestic terrorism as activities within the United States that:
- Involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state,
- Appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
- Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
- Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
From the moment of the Charleston church shooting, it was apparent that Roof’s motivations were driven by racist ideologies. In his manifesto, Roof cited a desire to start a race war and referenced prior white supremacist figures. The shooting, clearly a hate crime targeting African Americans, appeared to meet the criteria for domestic terrorism, given that it was intended to incite fear and violence within a particular racial group.
However, Roof was not initially charged with domestic terrorism. Instead, he faced federal charges of hate crimes and murder, and was later convicted on 33 counts, including the deaths of the nine victims. He was sentenced to death in January 2017. The decision to pursue hate crime charges rather than domestic terrorism charges might seem puzzling at first glance, but it reflects the complexities of how terrorism is defined and prosecuted in the United States.
Why Was Dylan Roof Not Charged with Domestic Terrorism?
Several factors likely contributed to the decision not to charge Roof with domestic terrorism. One significant reason is that domestic terrorism laws in the United States are quite limited, and prosecuting someone for terrorism requires meeting very specific criteria. While Roof’s actions were undeniably an act of racial violence, the U.S. legal system has traditionally been hesitant to apply terrorism charges in cases where the violence does not meet certain political criteria, such as coordinated plots or attacks with the intent to change government policies or destabilize the state.
Additionally, domestic terrorism charges carry with them a higher threshold for evidence of intent to terrorize a civilian population or influence governmental action. While Roof’s manifesto and stated intent to start a race war fit many aspects of a terrorist motive, legal prosecutors may have felt it was more straightforward to pursue charges under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act and the Federal Murder Statute, which already had clear precedents and legal frameworks for dealing with hate-motivated violence.
The decision to avoid terrorism charges also reflects broader systemic issues within U.S. law enforcement and the judicial system, where acts of racial violence have often been downplayed or classified under different legal categories. The absence of domestic terrorism charges against Roof, while disconcerting to many, is a symptom of the broader challenges in addressing ideologically driven violence in the U.S. legal system.
Could Donald Trump Pardon Dylan Roof?
The question of whether former President Donald Trump could have granted a pardon to Dylan Roof, or whether a future president could, hinges on a few key legal and constitutional principles. In the U.S., the president has the authority to issue pardons for federal crimes. This power is granted under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which states that the president has the authority “to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”
Pardon is a form of executive clemency, which absolves someone of the legal consequences of their conviction. However, this power is not without limits. The pardon only applies to federal convictions, and Dylan Roof’s crimes, though prosecuted at the federal level, were focused on federal hate crimes and murder, which he was convicted for in 2017. Trump had the authority to issue a pardon for Roof, but doing so would have been a highly controversial and politically sensitive decision, particularly given the racial motivations of Roof’s crimes and the national outcry following the shooting.
During his time in office, Trump was known for issuing pardons to various individuals, including some controversial figures. However, he did not pardon Roof. At the time, there was little indication that such a pardon was seriously considered. The backlash from granting a pardon in this case would have been immense, given the already explosive political and social ramifications of Roof’s crime. In fact, many critics believe that a pardon for Roof would have been an affront to the victims’ families, many of whom spoke publicly about their desire for Roof to face justice.
Could a future president pardon Roof? Legally, the answer is yes. A sitting president retains the power to pardon individuals convicted of federal crimes, and there is no statute or legal barrier that would prevent a future president from issuing such a pardon. However, any such action would almost certainly lead to significant public uproar. The racial and historical implications of pardoning someone convicted of racially motivated mass murder would likely ignite strong opposition from civil rights groups, the families of the victims, and the public at large.
The Larger Implications
Dylan Roof’s case remains a significant example of how issues of race, justice, and violence are intertwined within the U.S. legal system. The fact that Roof was not charged with domestic terrorism underscores the challenges of prosecuting ideologically motivated violence under existing legal frameworks. Moreover, the potential for a future pardon highlights the ways in which the executive branch holds significant power over the nation’s judicial processes, raising important questions about accountability and the protection of civil rights.
Ultimately, whether or not a president could or would pardon Roof is a matter of politics, public opinion, and legal considerations. What is clear is that Roof’s crime—motivated by hate and fear—was a tragic reminder of the deep racial divisions in the U.S. The lack of domestic terrorism charges for Roof points to broader systemic challenges in addressing ideologically driven violence in a way that accurately reflects its severity and impact on society. In a nation that strives for justice, we must continually grapple with how best to confront and address the reality of hate-fueled violence, particularly in a legal system that sometimes seems ill-equipped to deal with its complexities.
